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TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 8

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
853
People v. Ramos

(decided May 28, 1991)

A criminal defendant, convicted of second degree robbery and
second degree assault, asserted that his right to be present during
material stages of his trial under both the state 854 and federal 855
constitutions was violated when a trial judge permitted the defense attorney and prosecutor to exercise peremptory challenges
and challenges for cause outside the defendant's presence. 856 The
court held that the exercise of such challenges without the
defendant present did not violate defendant's right to be
7
present. 85
During voir dire, the trial judge stated his preference for taking
each attorney's challenges for cause and peremptory challenges in
the judge's robing room rather than in the courtroom. The trial
judge explained:
I am not concerned so much with the defendant. I am concerned
concluded that the informant's identity did not require disclosure. Id.
853. 173 A.D.2d 748, 570 N.Y.S.2d 247 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 78
N.Y.2d 1080, 583 N.E.2d 955, 577 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1991).
854. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6.
855. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
856. Ramos, 173 A.D.2d at 748, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 248. The defendant
further contended that the trial judge's procedure was violative of § 260.20 of
New York State's Criminal Procedure Law. This section provides:
A defendant must be personally present during the trial of an
indictment; provided, however, that a defendant who conducts himself
in so disorderly and disruptive a manner that his trial cannot be carried
on with him in the courtroom may be removed from the courtroom if,
after he has been warned by the court that he will be removed if he
continues such conduct, he continues to engage in such conduct.
N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 260.20 (McKinney 1982). The appellate division,
however, did not provide any separate analysis of this alleged statutory
violation.
857. Ramos, 173 A.D.2d at 749-50, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
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with the jury. I find that it is more expedient to take it inside.
Here at the side bar looking over at the panel you might
prejudice yourselves and you don't want to be - the jury
shouldn't know which of you have challenged a potential ju8
ror. 85
Both attorneys consented to this procedure and the challenges
were taken in the judge's robing room.
In rejecting the defendant's claim, the court followed the recent
New York Court of Appeals decision in People v. Velasco, 859
and stated that the criminal "defendant's right to be present does
not extend. . . to every discussion between counsel and the court
simply because it takes place during and pertains to the impaneling of the jury and the exercise of challenges." ' 860 The appellate
division added that "[w]hat is required is that a defendant have
meaningful opportunity to participate in the critical stage of determining the ultimate composition of the jury."' 861 In Ramos,
the court found that the defendant's rights were adequately
protected because he had an opportunity to consult with his
attorney during the voir dire and after the jury was impaneled. 862
The court's holding squarely followed the court of appeals' decision in Velasco, which held that a criminal defendant's right to
be present does not extend to every discussion between his or her
counsel and the trial judge during the voir dire.863 Accordingly,
the defendant's claim that he had a right to be present during a
conference in the judge's robing room was rejected. The court
did not provide a separate analysis for the state and federal
claims.864
858. Id. at 749, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
859. 77 N.Y.2d 469, 570 N.E.2d 1070, 568 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1991).
860. Ramos, 173 A.D.2d at 749, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 248 (citing Velasco, 77
N.Y.2d at 473, 570 N.E.2d at 1072, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 723).
861. Id. at 749, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
862. Id. at 749, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
863. Velasco, 77 N.Y.2d at 472-73, 570 N.E.2d at 1071-72, 568 N.Y.S.2d
at 722-23.
864. Ramos, 173 A.D.2d at 749-50, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 248-49. For analysis
of a criminal defendant's right to be present during the impaneling of the jury
under the state and federal constitutions, see Velasco, 77 N.Y.2d at 469, 570
N.E.2d at 1070, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
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